inventory stocks absorb the increase in sales, higher sales alone do not imply higher GDP or employment.
4
Overall, we find that the program had a very modest and short-lived effect on production.
Production was about 200,000 units higher during the program (in comparison to the 450,000 increase in sales). Sales from September 2009 to January 2010 were correspondingly lower than they would have been in the absence of CARS, which allowed producers to have lower production while still replenishing their inventory stocks. Thus on a quarterly basis we estimate that the CARS program shifted production by around 100,000 units from 2009Q4 and 2010Q1 to 2009Q3. These calculations suggest that the program had a negligible direct effect on GDP, shifting less than roughly $2 billion (or less than one-tenth of one percent of GDP) into 2009Q3 from the subsequent two quarters. This contrasts starkly with a study released by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the immediate aftermath of the program, which concluded that CARS had given a substantial boost to both GDP and employment. In the final section of the article, we discuss why our conclusions differ from those of the DOT study.
Our findings raise broader questions, beyond just this particular program, about the efficacy of efforts to stimulate short-term spending. It is clearly a mistake to gauge their impact by just looking at the spending they induce, without looking at the supply side. It is reasonable to expect that producers will use other margins than production and employment to respond to temporary movements in sales, so the only question is quantitative: How large is the gap between the sales and production impact? We find it to be large in the case of "Cash-for-Clunkers."
In what follows, we will lay out the economics behind our analysis by examining how rebates and other transitory price changes affect consumer purchases and manufacturers' inventory decisions. We then provide some background on the Cash for Clunkers program in Section II. Sections III and IV provide our analysis of the impact of the program, and Section V concludes.
I. Durable Goods and Inventories

A. Consumers
The consumer response to temporary price changes-including rebates and other subsidies-differs dramatically for durable and nondurable goods. Automobiles are a type of durable good, that is, a good that can be used or "consumed" over a number of years. Because a durable good can be stored, a temporary decline in its price will prompt consumers to "stock up." By contrast, a temporary drop in the price of a nondurable good-a good, such as milk or lawnmowing services, that is quickly consumed through use and cannot be stored-will not cause people to stock up.
Moreover, in the case of durable goods, consumers have considerable latitude in timing a purchase. Someone planning to replace a "clunker" can easily shift the timing by a few months.
So it is natural not only to expect a large sales response to a temporary subsidy for any durable good, but also to expect that much of that response will be offset by lower sales before or after the subsidy period, as consumers defer or move up their purchases to take advantage of the subsidy.
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B. Producers
Thus the cumulative impact on sales (and hence, production) is likely to be modest, if not zero, over a longer time frame. The only issue is how long it takes for the impact to dissipate: Do consumers shift their purchases by a few weeks, a few months, or longer?
For automobile producers, the key decisions are when and how much to produce in response to a temporary subsidy. Most automobiles are sold from inventories, not specially ordered. Dealers on average maintain inventories equivalent to approximately two and a half months' worth of sales.
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5 Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) , Hendel and Nevo (2006) , and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2010) demonstrate the importance of accounting for the timing of consumer purchases when comparing the effects of temporary and permanent price changes in durable goods.
Deviations from the average may occur for a variety of reasonsseasonal factors, an unexpected blip in sales, or changes in production or inventory holding costs-but they rarely persist. A large positive surprise in sales will cause inventories to decline for a time until they can be replenished by additional production. An anticipated jump in sales, if believed to be temporary, will also result in a decline in inventories, largely because producers 6 One explanation for the large inventory holdings is that dealers wish to avoid "stocking out," that is, not having the models on hand that buyers want. See, for example, Kahn (1987 Kahn ( , 1992 and Bils and Kahn (2000) . generally find it costly to change production by a large amount in either direction.
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Automobile producers and dealers thus have a number of options in responding to programs like CARS. If they have advance notice of the program, manufacturers can shift production forward to build up inventories, and then let the spike in sales following the launch of the program reduce inventories to normal levels. At the other extreme, they can leave their production plans unchanged, let inventories absorb the spike in sales, and then wait for inventories to recover when sales drop after the program expires. The first approach emphasizes the desire to avoid any stockouts, so as to maximize the sales from the program; the second emphasizes the firm's goal of minimizing its costs by smoothing production and letting inventories serve as a buffer.
And if that jump is viewed as, in effect, borrowed from future sales, no additional production is necessary to replenish inventories; the subsequent drop in sales will restore stock levels if production remains constant. Given this reluctance to boost or cut production significantly, an increase in sales that is accompanied by an increase in inventories is a sign that producers view the sales upturn as likely to persist. But if the jump in sales is viewed as just coming at the expense of future sales, it makes sense for firms to let inventory movements accommodate much of the sales movement rather than change production by a substantial amount.
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In actual practice, producers most likely adopt some combination of the two responses, because they care about avoiding stockouts and smoothing production. The relative importance that they assign to these motives will depend in part on the costs of shifting production forward to meet increased demand-for example, paying workers overtime, running second shifts, and coping with bottlenecks in supplies. It will also depend on the amount of profit that would be lost in the event of a stockout, which in turn depends on the size of the price-cost markup on the automobiles. Since the CARS program likely boosted these markups, we would expect at least some increase in production to avoid stockouts.
C. Seasonality
An additional complication affecting the production of automobiles is seasonality. U.S. automobile manufacturers typically shut down production for a period of weeks in the summer to retool plants for the next model year. During this time, they draw down inventories of the previous year's model and then begin to accumulate inventories of the new model after production starts up again. Manufacturers also shut down production during the Christmas-New Year's period for a week to ten days. These large and variable seasonal movements must be taken into account in analyzing industry data, especially the numbers in July and August-all the more so because in 2009 the CARS program was in effect during precisely those two months.
Despite these complications, the CARS program represents a unique opportunity to study the behavior of both consumers and producers. Particularly advantageous for our analysis is the fact that only some vehicle models were eligible for the rebate.
II. A Timeline of the CARS Act
While the existence of a subsidy may have induced some consumers to buy an eligible model when they otherwise would have chosen to buy an ineligible model, we nonetheless are able to use the data on the production and sales of ineligible models as a "control group" to help gauge the impact of the program. 
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9 The availability and size of the rebate depended on the extent to which the purchaser traded up in fuel efficiency. Some models were not eligible at all, while higher-fuel-efficiency models increased the number of buyers who could meet the eligibility requirements.
Congress allocated $1 billion to fund the program, and new car purchases and leases on and after July 1 were made eligible for rebates. 13 Because of the popularity of the CARS program, an additional $2 billion was allotted to the program on August 7. 14 Even with this extra allotment, the cash-for-clunkers program ran out of funds and ended on August 24. Overall, more than 677,000 vehicles received cash-for-clunkers financing, and roughly $2.8 billion was disbursed through the program.
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The size of the cash-for-clunkers rebate was linked to the difference in miles per gallon between the vehicle traded in and the new vehicle purchased (Table 1) .
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With 70 percent of all cash-for-clunkers rebates going to sales in August, the program clearly had a much larger impact in August than in July. The injection of $2 billion in additional funding on August 7 no doubt helps account for this difference, as does the fact that the CARS program eligibility criteria for a new vehicle purchase were not finalized until July 24. Hence, consumers may have delayed their purchase decisions in order to be sure that they qualified for the cash-for-clunkers rebate.
The set of new vehicles eligible for financing through CARS was quite broad, and included larger vehicles such as sport utility vehicles (SUVs), vans, and pickups. However, a quick scan of the vehicle types purchased under the program ( 
III. Impact of the CARS Program: Production, Inventory, and Sales Data
As a first step in analyzing the effects of the CARS program, we look at aggregate data on sales, production, and inventories for the U.S. automobile market in the period from January 2007 through February 2010. We then break out the data into vehicles that were eligible for financing under the CARS program and vehicles that were not. Eligible models accounted for roughly 75 percent of sales before the start of the program.
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The U.S. recession that began in December 2007 hit automobile sales particularly hard. that a large number of sales were shifted from September to August, as would be expected.
Production, however, shows little evidence of a spike during the period of the program, especially if one looks at the production of eligible relative to ineligible vehicles. Still, production of both types of vehicles did increase modestly at the onset of CARS, and remained at a higher level thereafter. But the similarity in the pattern of production for both eligible and ineligible vehicles, together with the permanence of the response, suggests that the increases were not primarily due to the CARS program, but instead owed much to the general firming of automobile sales that was taking place as the recession was ending.
20 See the appendix for a discussion of the importance of controlling for net imports when analyzing the CARS program's effects on production.
While the analysis thus far cannot put precise numbers on the production impact of the CARS program, it is clear that inventory reductions contributed substantially to accommodating the spike in sales. The next section quantifies these contributions in order to gauge the net impact of the program on U.S. motor vehicle production and, ultimately, on GDP.
IV. An Empirical Model of Production and Inventory Behavior
In this section, we undertake the more challenging task of quantifying the impact of We then examine alternative assumptions about inventory behavior to obtain estimates of what production would have been. The difference between actual automobile sales and production and these counterfactuals provides estimates of the net impact of the program.
Overall, the stronger the sales and production measures in our counterfactuals, the smaller the impact of the program will appear to be. , reflects the "target" months' supply, and we would expect β to be very close to one. The coefficients γs and γi indicate the response of the dependent variable to movements in the ECT. We would expect γs to be positive for two nonexclusive reasons: higher overall inventories mean fewer stockouts of individual models; and excess inventories above target could lead dealers to cut prices or find other ways to reduce excess inventory. The coefficient γi on the ECT of the equation for inventories should of course be negative.
A crucial assumption is that both industrial production ex-autos and sales of ineligible vehicles were not materially affected by the CARS program. There are certainly hypothetical reasons to doubt this assumption. Regarding sales of non-eligible vehicles, on the one hand, the availability of a rebate might have led many consumers to buy an eligible vehicle when they otherwise would have chosen an ineligible vehicle-a "substitution effect" that could have lowered sales of ineligible vehicles. On the other hand, working in the other direction is the possibility of individuals who did not qualify for the subsidies (because, for example, they lacked an eligible trade-in vehicle) opting to buy ineligible vehicles instead. In principle, either effect could dominate. We assume that the net effect is small relative to other influences on demand for these vehicles.
As for the industrial production series, although the series excludes production from the motor vehicle industry, there may have been spillover effects on related industries. Even the most sanguine accounts of the impact of the CARS program, such as the report of the Department of Transportation, suggests these effects were tiny and short-lived relative to the scale of the U.S. economy, and thus would not have accounted for virtually any of the nearly seven percent increase (at an annual rate) in this index in the second half of 2009.
These predictions are borne out; Table 3 provides estimates of these coefficients. The coefficient β is not significantly different from one, while the others have the expected signs.
While the estimates are qualitatively sensible, however, the model coefficients imply an implausibly slow adjustment of inventories. Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions implied by the parameter estimates of the model. Note that it takes approximately one year for inventories to respond fully to a shock to sales. Also somewhat surprising is the negligible (and initially slightly negative) impact of an inventory shock on sales, despite the positive and significant sign of γs .
A possible reason for the slow response is that the model is estimated over the relatively tranquil January 1994-June 2009 period, which included only one significant downturn at the end of the sample. The experience of the second half of 2009, as well as other episodes involving large change in sales, suggests that inventories can and do adjust more rapidly to some shocks.
We will return to this idea later in the discussion of the counterfactuals.
The results of this first counterfactual exercise are plotted in Figure 7 as "Scenario 1."
The difference between this scenario and the actual path of sales (top panel) suggests that the CARS program essentially shifted sales that would have taken place from September through December 2009 to the months of July and August. Thus, by January 2010 cumulative sales since
June were no higher, according to this counterfactual exercise, than they would have been without the CARS program.
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As foreshadowed by the impulse response function results, the production response in this first counterfactual is quite sluggish (Figure 7 , middle panel), implying that inventories would have fallen and remained below two months' supply for at least six months in the absence of the CARS program ( Figure 7 , bottom panel). This representation of the behavior of inventories is, however, implausible: In the data going back to 1994, months' supply has never been below two for more than two consecutive months. The weak production response also implies an implausibly large and prolonged impact of the CARS program on production, as discussed below. Since actual production rebounded to its December level,
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21 This conclusion is somewhat affected by seasonal adjustment. The Bureau of Economic Analysis' adjustments of the data smooth the series more than our method does. We estimate that if the adjusted data had been available for eligible and ineligible vehicles, we would have found that the cumulative impact extended into February 2010 rather than December 2009. The fourth-quarter impact would still have been negative, however.
the cumulative impact of CARS on production implied by this counterfactual was still strongly positive long after the impact on sales had dissipated.
The fact that months' supply actually remained close to normal from October 2009 onward suggests that the industry viewed the higher level of sales in the second half of the year as likely to persist, and accordingly ramped up production and built up inventory levels.
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But why would the VEC estimates fail to accurately depict the production response? Our argument is that while the VEC model may be reasonable for some purposes, such as generating conditional sales forecasts, it may be too simple to capture inventory behavior, especially in the unusual circumstances of the unprecedented downturn of 2008-2009. In addition, going back to Feldstein and Auerbach (1976) there has long been a suspicion that simple dynamic adjustment models are misspecified in a way that results in implausibly slow inventory adjustment. This rapid return of months' supply to normal levels occurred in other recent episodes involving temporary incentive programs, and it calls into question the model's prediction that, in the absence of the program, production would have adjusted only slowly to an increase in sales.
In the case of the VEC, the linearity and symmetry of the error correction term may be at issue. Many inventory models have different properties when inventories are far away from their long-run steady state, and may respond differently when that gap is positive versus negative. For example, if inventory-sales ratios are extremely high, the non-negativity constraint on production can bind. The marginal cost of being away from the target ratio may be nonlinear. As evidence, we added threshold indicator variables to the VEC specification, one for when the inventorysales ratio exceeds 3.0, and one for when it falls below 2.0. When we estimate the VEC model over the full sample with these variables added as exogenous explanatory variables, we find that the "above 3'' dummy variable is not significant, but the ``below 2'' one is highly significant with coefficients of 0.066 in the inventory equation and −0.078 in the sales equation. This means that when the ratio falls below two, it gets a "kick'' to the tune of an extra 15 percent relative to the simple VEC estimate.
In light of this apparent weakness in our first counterfactual based entirely on the VEC estimates, we propose two alternative scenarios, premised on the view that manufacturers' would not have allowed inventory-sales ratios to remain persistently below two as depicted in Figure 7 , Scenario 1. The idea is that manufacturers' recognized the increase in sales in late 2009 (after the CARS program ended) as a genuine, albeit incomplete, recovery and produced so as to 23 In the five months from October 2009 through February 2010, sales averaged more than 900,000 units, compared with approximately 800,000 in the first five months of 2009. maintain inventory/sales ratios at relatively normal levels (as they actually did even with the CARS program except for August 2009). The fact that the industry was able to keep months' supply close to normal in the wake of the large jump in sales due to the CARS program, it likely would have done so with the more gradual sales increase depicted in Figure 7 .
In our baseline specification, Scenario 2, we assume that the inventory-sales ratio is at the VEC estimate for July and August, and then tracks the data thereafter. This allows the ratio to fall as low as 2.29 We also consider a more extreme scenario, labeled Scenario 3, in which producers let the inventory-sales track the VEC estimate through September, but then gradually adjust inventories to get the ratio back to "normal" (the level in the actual data) by November.
Scenario 3 is more optimistic because its prediction of the impact of cash-for-clunkers on production will be greater than the predictions from the baseline specification, Scenario 2. The Each scenario's inventory-sales ratio assumption implies a path for production plus net imports (that is, U.S. sales plus the change in inventories). Given that net imports appear to have been unaffected by the program, we infer a path for production based on an estimated historical relationship between production and net imports.
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The production paths implied by Scenario 2 and 3 (see Figure 7) , show a much stronger surge in assemblies in comparison to Scenario 1. As we detail below, these stronger surges are also more transitory. Indeed, both Scenarios 2 and 3 suggest that the CARS program's impact on production was mostly confined to 2009. 24 See the appendix for details.
For all the scenarios, we assess the cumulative net impact of the program on sales and production ( Figure 8 ). More specifically, we compute the difference between actual sales (production) and the sales (production) predicted by the counterfactual for each month. We then take the cumulative sum of these differences to gauge the sales (production) impact of the cashfor-clunkers program over time. 25 Recall that both counterfactuals use the same sales forecast, but have differing production and inventory forecasts.
26 Li et al. (2010) use Canadian sales as an indicator of what would have happened without a cash-for-clunkers program. The difficulty with this approach is that Canada's macroeconomic conditions in 2009 were very different from those in the United States. The Canadian downturn was much milder, so one would expect a milder rebound. Li et al. have some controls for these conditions, but we would argue that given the extreme and almost unprecedented nature of the U.S. downturn and the policy responses it elicited, it is preferable to use data from the U.S. market. Hence, we use U.S. sales of ineligible vehicles as our benchmark counterfactual. Mian and Sufi (2010) , using a cross-sectional approach, also find that sales were merely pulled forward into the program period, so that the cumulative impact of the program had evaporated by early 2010. 27 We calculate this nominal expenditure figure by multiplying our estimates of vehicle sales due to the CARS program in July, August, and September of 2009 by the appropriate average expenditure-per-vehicle figures reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
added to the movement of vehicles from inventory to sales. We estimate this value-added from dealerships to be 4 percent of nominal expenditures (dealerships typically apply a 4 percent markup to the sale of new vehicles). Table 4 gives the net production impact by quarter for the three alternative scenarios. As explained above, the net impact on production implied by the first counterfactual, Scenario 1, is implausibly large and prolonged relative to the sales impact. By contrast, the production impact implied by the more credible Scenarios 2 and 3 peak earlier (in the 200,000 to 300,000 range), and most of the impact is dissipated by December (see Figure 8 ). Both Scenarios 2 and 3 predict that cash-for-clunkers nudged up GDP by $2 billion in the second half of 2009, by drawing roughly 100,000 units of production forward from the first quarter of 2010. This movement in output is negligible, and has little impact whatsoever on the level of growth rate of GDP.
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Consequently, the shift in sales implies a $265 million shift in GDP-equal to less than 1/100 of 1 percent of GDP-from the fourth to the third quarter of 2009.
Looking at the third and fourth quarters of 2009, our baseline specification reinforces the result that cash-for-clunkers did little to impact output. In Scenario 2, cash-for-clunkers impacts third quarter production by less than 100,000 units, an increase of less than $2 billion to GDP.
As shown in Figure 8 , the cumulative production impact peaks in August before rapidly falling in September. In this baseline prediction, higher sales are mostly offset by inventory reductions and the only production response to cash-for-clunkers is a rearrangement of assemblies within the third quarter (and so has no impact on quarterly GDP). Even taking into account the $265 million direct effect of sales on GDP, in this baseline specification we find at most a negligible impact of cash-for-clunkers on third quarter GDP.
To gauge how much of an impact our model could generate in the third quarter of 2009, we consider our optimistic prediction. Under Scenario 3, the cumulative production impact in the third quarter is 287,000 units, more than three times as much as our baseline prediction. This translates into a large $6.5 billion bump in third quarter GDP, enough of an increase to inch up the growth rate in the third quarter by 0.2 percentage points. This effect on GDP is short-lived, however, with most of the increase unwound in the fourth quarter, creating a commiserate drag on the growth rate of fourth quarter GDP.
One important component of the automobile market that we have neglected so far is the secondary market for automobiles. The interaction between new and used markets could potentially affect our results. In particular, because the cash-for-clunkers program stipulated that the "clunkers" used to earn financing were to be scrapped, the reduction in the stock of used cars could have spurred demand for eligible and ineligible cars from September 2009 onward.
However, such an outcome seems unlikely for two reasons. First, households own more than 250 million cars, and so the scrapping of fewer than 700,000 cars (0.3 percent of the total automobile stock) is a tiny adjustment to the stock of cars. 29 Furthermore, we expect the interaction between new car sales and "clunkers" to be minimal, given that the average age of the vehicle traded in under the cash-for-clunkers program was sixteen years.
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Finally, we should address the sharp differences between our findings on the effects of the CARS program and those presented by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in an official report to Congress. 31 The relevant sections of the Department's report are based partly on the results of a survey of consumers who participated in the cash-for-clunkers program, and partly on a previous analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA).
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Space does not permit a thorough explanation of the differences in our findings, but a key factor is that our analysis has the advantage of hindsight.
The report finds that the program "resulted in a $3.8 billion to $6.8 billion increase in GDP, contributing significantly to GDP growth in the third quarter, and created or saved over 60,000 jobs." Neither of these studies, however, examined production and inventory behavior. The key finding in our study is that despite the program's positive impact on sales in the third quarter of 2009, automobile production showed a much smaller increase in the quarter as a whole, both because a large portion of the sales increase came out of inventories, and even the modest stepup in production in July and August was partly offset by retrenchment in and September.
Further, in the fourth quarter of 2009 sales and production were below where they would have been absent the CARS program, so that by early 2010 the cumulative impact of the program was nil.
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While the CARS program had ecological goals, its timing and limited duration suggest that its primary purpose was to stimulate economic activity. And by this measure, the program's impact appears to have been quite ephemeral. That said, the movement of sales from the fourth to the third quarter of 2009 might have had beneficial indirect effects-for example, by increasing revenues for automobile dealers who were struggling in the recession. In the absence of the program, some of these dealers might not have made it to the fourth quarter.
Another implication of our analysis is that inventories may be much less sluggish than many economic models-including the model used in our first counterfactual scenariosuggest.
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34 While the DOT report suggests that inventory reductions were a goal of the program, presumably that was only as a means to stimulating production and employment, on the assumption that sales were not completely borrowed from the immediate future.
Although the months' supply measure remained very elevated for about a year during the steep downturn of 2008, it had returned to its normal level by the time the CARS program was launched. Despite the large movements in sales in the second half of 2009, this measure deviated substantially from its normal level for only one month. The industry kept production and imports far below normal in the first half of 2009 to reduce inventories in line with lower sales, and then acted quickly to move production forward-both in response to the CARS 35 The classic study of Feldstein and Auerbach (1976) first documented the implausibly slow estimated speeds of inventory adjustment.
program and to the sustained recovery in sales that followed-to ensure that inventories remained near target. Note: "cfc sales" stands for sales that received a cash-for-clunkers rebate, "eligible sales" stands for sales of cars eligible for a rebate. There were 677,081 cfc sales in the original data. After cleaning the data (e.g. dropping observations with "unlisted" model names) there were 673,383 cfc sales. Source: Ward's Communications; https://www.edmunds.com; authors' calculations. Note: A data point equals the cumulative sum of past differences between actual sales (production) and the sales (production) predicted under the scenario. 
